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UNITED STATES V. LIFSHITZ: WARRANTLESS
COMPUTER MONITORING AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Lifshitz,' the Second Circuit held that the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
probationers from overbroad computer monitoring as a condition of
probation.2 The defendant in Lifshitz claimed that warrantless, state-
imposed computer monitoring, on its face, infringed his right to be
free from unreasonable searches.3 Thus, the court had to determine
whether the state, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, could
monitor a probationer's computer use without running afoul of the
Fourth Amendment. 4 The court resolved the issue by comparing
computer monitoring to random drug testing.5 In doing so, the court
did not focus on computers as a medium.6 Instead, the court
evaluated the content of the computer monitoring policy. As a result,
the court demanded that the search condition be narrowly tailored to
meet the state's needs without "sweep[ing] so broadly as to draw a
wide swath of extraneous material into its net."
7
The Lifshitz opinion rests on the jurisprudence of "special
needs" searches.8 The Fourth Amendment assures the right of
individuals "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." 9 In most cases, the
1. 369 F.3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
2.Id.
3. Id. at 175.
4. Id. at 182.
5. Id. at 183-87.
6. Id. at 183.
7. Id. at 190.
8. Id. at 193.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV. Fourth Amendment protection extends beyond
the criminal justice context to all government searches. New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985), including those conducted by public school
2249
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Fourth Amendment's demand for reasonableness requires a valid
warrant or a showing of probable cause before the state conducts a
search.' 0 However, courts allow exceptions when "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable."" Courts determine the
validity of a special needs search by weighing an individual's
expectation of privacy against the government's interest in foregoing
"a warrant or some level of individualized suspicion."'12 It was this
balancing that led the court in Lifshitz to demand that the state's
computer monitoring be narrowly tailored to its objective for the
search. 3
The imposition of computer or Internet restrictions as conditions
of community supervision is on the rise.14 Some circuits have upheld
supervision conditions that ban Internet use altogether.'" Others,
including the Second Circuit, have favored monitoring over an outright
ban, which they see as "a greater deprivation.., than is reasonably
necessary. ' 16 However, as the discussion above indicates, computer
personnel, id., probation officers, Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987), and government employers, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715
(1987).
10. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873.
11. TL.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment).
12. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
13. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
14. Brian W. McKay, Student Work, Guardrails on the Information
Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender,
106 W. VA. L. REV. 203, 220 (2003); see also, Ken Strutin, Bans on Internet
Use as Punishment Are Under Scrutiny, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 11, 2005, at 5 (noting
"the meaning of reasonableness in the context of restrictions on Internet or
computer access is the question now facing courts").
15. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding
a condition that required the defendant to obtain permission of the probation
officer prior to accessing the Internet); United States v. Paul, 24 F.3d 155,
169-70 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a complete ban on Internet use as a term of
supervised release for a convicted sex offender).
16. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (striking a
condition prohibiting a probationer convicted of receiving child pornography
from accessing a computer or the Internet without his probation officer's
approval); see also Christopher Wiest, Comment and Casenote, The Netsurfing
Split: Restriction Imposed on Internet and Computer Usage by Those Con-
victed of a Crime Involving a Computer, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 850-61
(2003) (providing a detailed summary of the circuit courts' treatment of
Internet prohibitions).
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monitoring poses its own constitutional conundrum, as it forces courts
to balance individual privacy and public safety. The Lifshitz opinion
is significant not only because it offers an approach to meeting this
challenge, but also because of its broader implications for computer
privacy in general.
This Comment discusses how the Second Circuit applied the
special needs standard to suspicionless probationary computer
monitoring and examines the possible privacy implications of its
decision. Part II summarizes the facts in Lifshitz and the procedural
background to the Second Circuit opinion. Part III presents the
development of special needs jurisprudence leading up to Lifshitz.
Part IV discusses the Second Circuit's application of the special
needs doctrine in its Lifshitz decision. Finally, Part V considers the
practical implications of Lifshitz along with its broader privacy
implications.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 8, 2001, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents
paid a visit to the home Brandon Lifshitz shared with his mother,
sister and niece. 17 The agents made the house call to investigate
online exchanges of child pornography on accounts registered in the
name of Lifshitz's mother. 18 During an interview with the agents,
Brandon admitted that he had downloaded and disseminated child
pornography.' 9 In addition, the family consented to a search of their
computer, which uncovered pornographic pictures of children.20 As
a result, Brandon was indicted on two counts for violating section
2252A of the United States Code, which makes it a crime to
knowingly receive or distribute any child pornography that has been
transported in interstate commerce.
21
Lifshitz entered a plea bargain in which he pled guilty to
receiving child pornography in exchange for the state's agreement to
22drop the other count (for distribution). During the sentencing
phase, the court reviewed psychological reports that, though not in
17. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 175.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 18 U.S.C.S. § 2252A (LexisNexis 2004).
22. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 176.
December 2005] 2251
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:2249
agreement on the precise diagnosis, all concluded that he was
emotionally troubled. 23 In addition, a fourth report suggested that
imprisonment could exacerbate Lifshitz's psychological problems.24
As a result, the trial court sentenced Lifshitz to three years
probation.
25
The court imposed mandatory computer monitoring as a
condition of Lifshitz's probation.26 The terms of the condition
originally required that Lifshitz consent to the installation of systems
that would have enabled the probation office to monitor and filter
computer use on a regular or random basis on any computer he
owned or controlled. In addition, he had to agree to "unannounced
examinations of any computer equipment [he] owned or
controlled... which may result in the retrieval and copying of all
data from the computer and any internal or external peripherals and
may involve removal of such equipment for the purpose of
conducting a more thorough investigation."
28
Lifshitz's attorney fought the search condition, citing Griffin v.
Wisconsin29 for the proposition that a probation officer could not
conduct a search without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. 30 The
state countered that because Lifshitz used a computer to commit his
crime, the government could subject his computer to a suspicionless
23. One diagnosed Lifshitz as suffering from a personality disorder but
found no evidence that he was a sexual predator. Id. Another agreed that
Lifshitz had a personality disorder but "provisionally diagnosed pedophilia...
and sexual sadism." Id. The third doctor asserted that Lifshitz suffered from
depression and obsessive-compulsive disorder at the time of his arrest, brought
on by the death of his father four years earlier. Id. In addition, there was
evidence that Lifshitz, who was thirty when he was arrested, had initiated an
incestuous relationship with his sister as a teenager and had corresponded
online with an 18-year-old woman to whom he paid a visit. Id. at 175-76. The
question of whether Lifshitz was a sexual predator is relevant because the
viability of conditions on Internet access depends in part on the "nexus
between the crime and continued access to the Internet." Susan S. Kreston,
Computer Search and Seizure Issues in Internet Crimes Against Children
Cases, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 327, 364 (2004).
24. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 177.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
30. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 177.
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search.31 The district court agreed in part with defense counsel and
inserted the words "upon reasonable suspicion" before the second
part of the condition, which allowed for unannounced in-person
computer searches or seizure and examination of computer
32equipment. However, the court then held that the first part of the
condition, which permitted a probation officer "to monitor and filter
computer use," did not require suspicion.33 As a result, while a
probation officer could not go to Lifshitz's home to search his
computer unless a reasonable suspicion prompted him to do so, an
officer could remotely "monitor" Lifshitz's computer use absent any
suspicion. Defense counsel appealed.34
III. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS AND SPECIAL NEEDS:
LEADING UP TO THE LIFSH1TZ DECISION
A. Creating a Foundation for Special Needs: Camara and Katz
The Fourth Amendment not only guarantees the right of every
person to be free from unreasonable searches, it also provides that
"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 35 There has
been considerable debate over whether the Warrant Clause defines
the requirements for a reasonable search or if it operates inde-
pendently of the Reasonableness Clause.36  The Supreme Court
answered this question to some extent37 in Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco,38 when it replaced "probable cause' ' 39 with
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 177-178.
34. Id. at 177.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Special Needs and the Fourth Amendment: An
Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R-C.L.
L. REv. 529, 529 (1997) (stating "[a] small forest has been pulped by legal
scholars" debating this issue).
37. Christopher Mebane, Note, Rediscovering the Foundation of the Special
Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
40 Hous. L. REv. 177, 188 (2003).
38. 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
39. Probable cause requires that facts and circumstances "within the
affiant's knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
are sufficient unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution to
believe that an offense has been or is being committed." Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967) (citations omitted).
December 2005] 2253
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"reasonableness" as the standard of review for administrative
searches, such as health and safety inspections.
40
In the same year it decided Camara, the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Katz v. United States,41 which declared, "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. ' 42  Katz is significant
because it marks the Court's departure from defining Fourth
Amendment protection in terms of physical spaces.43 At the same
time, the Court provided "no guidance for determining... when the
Amendment protects people."" In his concurrence, Justice Harlan
asserted that the Fourth Amendment protects an "actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy... that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' 45 This expectation is crucial because if an individual
does not possess it, the Fourth Amendment does not offer any
protection. 6 At the same time, "Katz's malleability... made it
especially vulnerable in cases involving technological change."
47
The Court's new focus on individual expectations of privacy in
Katz, and its incremental shift away from probable cause to a
reasonableness standard in Camara, set the stage for its special needs
jurisprudence.48 Courts determine the reasonableness of a special
40. Camera, 387 U.S. at 535. However, that same year, in Berger v. State
of New York, the Court vigorously upheld probable cause as the standard for
law enforcement searches. 388 U.S. 41, 57-59 (1967). In Berger, the Court
struck a New York statute that allowed a court to issue a wire-tapping warrant
upon a showing of "reasonable ground to believe" a crime had been committed
because it failed to require particularity in the warrant regarding the specific
crime or the "persons to be searched." Id. at 55-56.
41. 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
42. Id.
43. Tracey Maclin, Katz, Kyllo and Technology: Virtual Fourth Amend-
ment Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MiSs. L.J. 51, 61-62 (2002).
44. Id. at 74 (emphasis added).
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's concurrence
endured to become the standard today. Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the
Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 307, 318 (1998).
46. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to subjective expectations of privacy that "society
is not prepared to recognize as legitimate"); Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating,
"What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
47. Maclin, supra note 43, at 75.
48. Mebane, supra note 37, at 189. Cf Buffaloe, supra note 36, at 535
(stating that Camara does not advance the idea that civil searches do not
2254
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needs search by balancing an individual's privacy interest against the
government's need to conduct a warrantless search.49 The Court
applied this balancing inquiry in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 5° which
commentators point to as the Court's seminal special needs case.
5 1
B. Creating the Special Needs Exception: New Jersey v. T.L.O.
In New Jersey v. T.L. 0., the Court examined whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibited a school official from conducting a
warrantless search of a student's purse upon reasonable suspicion of
wrongdoing. 52 After finding that the Fourth Amendment applied to
the actions of public school personnel,53 the Court went on to state
that students have an expectation of privacy in the personal items
they bring with them to school.54 However, the Court also found that
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on searches absent a warrant or
probable cause would interfere with school officials' need for "swift
and informal... procedures" to maintain discipline.
55
A warrant requires a formal judicial proceeding, something
certain to hinder school officials in their efforts to maintain
discipline. Similarly, probable cause requires circumstances
sufficient to believe that an offense has been committed, which may
place a burden on school officials to ascertain sufficient facts prior to
conducting a search.56 On the other hand, reasonable suspicion can
arise from less information or where information is less reliable.
57
The Court in New Jersey v. T.L.0. felt the government's interest in
require a warrant).
49. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66
(1989).
50. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
51. Buffaloe, supra note 36, at 536; Mebane, supra note 37, at 189.
52. 469 U.S. at 341.
53. Id. at 333.
54. Id. at 339.
55. Id. at 340.
56. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
57. The Court in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), stated,
"Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not
only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information
that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause." Id.
at 330.
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school discipline sufficiently outweighed students' individual pri-
vacy interests such that the lesser reasonable suspicion standard
applied.
58
The Supreme Court noted that determining the reasonableness of
a search requires "a twofold inquiry.. . . ,59 It instructed courts to
consider whether a search "was justified at its inception" and
"reasonably related in scope" to that justification.60 The Court
declined to consider whether individualized suspicion was an
essential element of the standard.6'
The Supreme Court has not yet answered whether probationary
searches require reasonable suspicion. 62  However, the Supreme
Court has upheld suspicionless special needs searches outside the
probation context.63  In addition, several circuits have u~held
suspicionless searches of probationers, including drug testing and
DNA collection. 65 Moreover, courts have noted that individuals on
supervised release have lesser expectations of privacy.
66
IV. SPECIAL NEEDS APPLIED:
THE SECOND CIRCurr's DECISION IN LIFSHIZ
In Lifshitz, the Second Circuit chose a middle course between
requiring reasonable suspicion and giving the government complete
freedom to monitor a probationer's computer use. It rejected defense
counsel's position that the government could not search Lifshitz's
computer use without some reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
67
At the same time, the court did not find that the imposition of a
58. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41.
59. Id. at 341.
60. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 329 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
61. Id. at 342.
62. McKay, supra note 14, at 215-16.
63. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 842 (2002) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of high school students participating in
extracurricular activities); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 676 (1989) (upholding random employee drug testing).
64. United States v. Wright, 86 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 1996).
65. See, e.g., Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999); Boling v.
Romer, 101 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th
Cir. 1992).
66. Wright, 86 F.3d at 65 ("Persons on supervision do not enjoy absolute
liberty but only conditional liberty dependent upon observance of special
conditions.").
67. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 188 (2d Cir. 2004).
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search condition eliminated a probationer's expectation of privacy
altogether. 68 Instead, the Second Circuit held that the special needs
of the probation system were sufficient to justify suspicionless
computer monitoring, but that monitoring could not be overbroad.69
Thus, it vacated the district court ruling and remanded the case so
that the lower court could ensure that the form of monitoring
employed by the state bore a "'close and substantial relation' to the
government's interest in pursuing the search.
' 70
A. Probationary Searches and the Government's Special Needs
The Second Circuit began its analysis in Lifshitz by reviewing
the Supreme Court's rulings on probationary searches.7 1 The
Supreme Court provides three reasons supporting the government's
need to conduct warrantless searches in the probation context. First,
community supervision aims to promote the rehabilitation of the
probationer and to protect the community until the probationer
achieves that goal.72 Second, a warrant would make it difficult for
probation officers to respond quickly to misconduct. 73 Finally, such
a delay would dampen the deterrent effect of the search condition.74
In Lifshitz, the Second Circuit found that these special needs
were particularly important in light of the government's interest in
stopping child pornography.75 Because Lifshitz used a computer to
commit his crime, computer monitoring "would serve a substantial
deterrent purpose., 76  As a result, monitoring would also aid in
Lifshitz's rehabilitation by forcing him to keep his computer habits
under control. 77  Finally, the court noted that the high rate of
recidivism among sex offenders made the government's interest in
68. Id. at 190.
69. Id. at 193.
70. Id. at 192 (quoting Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489
U.S. 656, 676 (1989)).
71. Id. at 179.
72. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
73. Id. at 876.
74. "The probationer would be assured that so long as his illegal...
activities were sufficiently concealed as to give rise to no more than a
reasonable suspicion, they would go undetected and uncorrected." Id. at 878.
75. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 189.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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deterrence and rehabilitation especially acute.78
B. Probationers'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Second Circuit asserted that the imposition of a
probationary search condition reduces a probationer's expectation of
privacy. 79 The court further suggested that although individuals
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers,
that same privacy interest does not extend to transmissions over the
Internet or to email that has already reached its recipient.80 In
addition, the court noted that employees have no privacy interest in
downloaded Internet files when their employer has implemented a
policy that online activity would be monitored.8' Thus, a
probationer's privacy interests depend "on the type of monitoring
implemented-whether investigating local computer activity or
materials sent through an Internet Service Provider to another
machine."
8 2
C. Balancing Public Needs and Personal Privacy: Defining the
Proper Scope of Warrantless Computer Monitoring
While the Second Circuit determined there were special needs
sufficient to justify warrantless computer monitoring and a
diminished expectation of privacy on the part of the probationer, the
court still had to answer whether reasonable suspicion should be
required.83 As noted, the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on
whether probation officers can conduct suspicionless searches of
their wards.84  Likewise, the Court has not indicated whether a
78. Id. at 189-90.
79. Id. at 190.
80. Id. The court cited Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001), which
held that individuals lack an expectation of privacy in: e-mails once they were
sent to the recipient; computer records intended for public posting; and
subscriber information transmitted to systems operators. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at
190 (citing Guest, 255 F.3d at 333, 336).
8 1. Lifshitz at 187.
82. Id. at 190.
83. Id.
84. McKay, supra note 14, at 217. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court held
that a search of a probationer's home was reasonable because it was conducted
pursuant to a valid state regulation. 483 U.S. 868, 880 (1987). The Court
declined to review whether there was reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
the search at issue in the case. Id. at n.6. Likewise, in United States v.
2258
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probationer's acceptance of a search term constitutes a consent to
search. 85  As a result, the Second Circuit turned to its own
jurisprudence for answers.
Prior to its Lifshitz decision, in United States v. Sofsky,86 the
Second Circuit suggested that unannounced computer inspections are
a preferable alternative to banning a person convicted of receiving
child pornography from using a computer or the Internet absent
87
permission from a probation officer. However, the court did not
reach whether reasonable suspicion should be required prior to such
a search. The court's prior opinions on probationary searches did not
directly address the issue either.88 Thus, the Second Circuit looked
to special needs jurisprudence in other contexts.
Without direct case law on the issue, the parties in Lifshitz
argued over the appropriate Fourth Amendment analogy.89 The
Knights, the Court did not reach the issue because it found that the probation
officers had reasonable suspicion prior to conducting the search. 534 U.S. 112,
120 n.6 (2001).
85. McKay, supra note 14, at 215. In Knights, the Court declined to reach
the issue of whether acceptance of a search condition constitutes consent to a
search because the search was reasonable under general Fourth Amendment
principles. 534 U.S. at 118.
86. 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002).
87. Id. ("Although the condition prohibiting Sofsky from accessing a
computer or the Internet without his probation officer's approval is reasonably
related to the purposes of his sentencing... we hold that the condition
inflicts a greater deprivation on Sofsky's liberty than is reasonably
necessary.").
88. In United States v. Grimes, the Second Circuit upheld a search of a
parolee because the conduct of the parole officer was rationally related to the
performance of her duty. 225 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second
Circuit got closer to the issue in United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2d Cir.
2002). There, the court held that probation officers conducting a home visit do
not have to have a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before making a home
visit because probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and home
visits are not the same as a search of the home. Id. at 462. In Roe v. Marcotte,
193 F.3d 72, (2d Cir. 1999), the court upheld obtaining DNA samples from
imprisoned sex offenders because the intrusion on privacy was minimal and
the "lack of discretionary application of the procedure minimized the concerns
traditionally underlying the requirements of probable cause and reasonable
suspicion." Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 187 (citing Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 79-80).
89. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 182. The Second Circuit's search for an analogy is
not that unusual. Analogies to "earlier notions of privacy are abundant in
recent case law regarding computer technology." Amy E. Wells, Comment,
Criminal Procedure: The Fourth Amendment Collides with the Problem of
Child Pornography and the Internet, 53 OLKA. L. REv. 99, 113 (2000).
2259December 2005]
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prosecution asserted that computer monitoring is like random drug
testing, which the Supreme Court has approved under certain
conditions. 90 Defense counsel countered that computer monitoring,
unlike drug testing, can be continuous and potentially unlimited in
scope.91 Neither side won. Ultimately, the court did analogize to
drug testing, but it did so in a way that addressed the concerns
expressed by the defense.
The Second Circuit's analysis honed in on those aspects of
random drug testing that led the Supreme Court to decide that it did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. In order to avoid a Fourth
Amendment violation, the state must conduct random drug tests in a
manner that is minimally physically invasive.92 In other words, the
manner in which the urine is collected should afford the individual
some privacy during the act of producing the sample.93 In addition,
the test must exclude extraneous information, such as whether the
person has a medical condition or eats a particular food.
94
The Second Circuit's recommended guidelines for warrantless
computer monitoring borrowed from the drug testing guidelines.
Drawing on the minimally physically invasive requirement, the court
focused on the method of computer monitoring. It noted that
"continuous but narrowly circumscribed monitoring via software
might present less of an intrusion in Lifshitz's privacy than computer
searches by the probation officer." 95 In addition, the Second Circuit
further instructed the district court to consider imposing filtering
software if it appeared to be no less effective than continuous
monitoring.
96
The Second Circuit also focused on the fact that the Supreme
Court drug testing cases required that urinalysis be "precisely
targeted" to detect only drug use.97 The court likewise required that
the computer monitoring "not sweep so broadly as to draw a wide
90. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 182
91. Id.
92. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832-33 (2002).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 826.
95. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 192.
96. Id. at 193. Unlike monitoring software, which continuously runs on the
computer, filtering software merely blocks the user from accessing certain web
pages or other online content. Id. at 191-92.
97. Id. at 190.
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swath of extraneous material into its net." 98 It noted that software
designed to alert a probation officer when Lifshitz engaged in
impermissible Internet activities "would bear [a] much greater
resemblance to screening a probationer's urine for particular drugs-
as opposed to investigating a sample to ascertain all medical
conditions.., the individual suffer[s] [from] or to figure out his or
her favorite foods."
99
By drawing this analogy, the court seemed to suggest that the
state should employ computer monitoring techniques that look for
illegal behavior and nothing more. Because the record before it did
not reveal what kind of monitoring the probation condition
authorized, the Second Circuit remanded to the district court to
impose a condition consistent with its decision.
00
Finally, the Second Circuit placed one last check on the state's
power to monitor Lifshitz's computer use. It noted that in the future,
Lifshitz could present evidence to the district court that equally
effective, less intrusive methods of controlling his computer use were
available. 1 1 If he made his case, the district court could modify its
order accordingly.1
0 2
V. CONTEXT AND CONTENT MATTER: ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF THE SECOND CIRCurr'S DECISION IN LIFSHITZ
In Lifshitz, the Second Circuit focused on the terms of the search
condition rather than on the computer as a medium. It correctly
noted that a computer's versatility made it important for the court to
scrutinize the nature of the search at issue.
[C]omputers serve a multiplicity of functions, from mailbox
(in sending and receiving e-mail), to telephone (in accessing
particular IP addresses and web pages), to financial systems
(by both permitting on-line payment mechanisms and
recording personal financial data), to home offices, to
storage bins. It is, therefore, not the nature of computers
themselves that determines what type of search occurs, but
the manner in which particular monitoring software or
98. Id.
99. Id. at 192.
100. Id. at 193.
101. Id.
102. Id.
2261December 2005]
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techniques operate and the kind of computer activity that
they target.1
0 3
Thus, the court focused on the government interest in
conducting the search and the type of search rather than on whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a computer
per se.
The court's nuanced approach to computer searches prompts
practical concerns as well as broader privacy implications. On the
practical level, the Second Circuit's requirements that computer
monitoring be minimally invasive and narrowly tailored place a
substantial fact-finding burden on district courts. In terms of policy,
privacy advocates may be dismayed by further expansion of the
special needs doctrine and the court's apparent willingness to
disregard online privacy.
A. Practical Consequences: District Courts as Technology Pundits
In the Lifshitz ruling, the Second Circuit left it to the district
court to determine just what methods of computer monitoring are
permissible. This places a heavy burden on the lower courts to
review search technologies and find facts regarding their
effectiveness in targeting specific types of computer use. Lifshitz
exacerbates this burden by providing that a probationer could return
to the court and request a modification of the supervision conditions
upon introduction of a new privacy-enhancing search capability. In
addition, each approach to computer monitoring can be circumvented
depending on the technical skills of the probationer. As a result,
courts must continually revise search approaches depending on the
available technology and the characteristics of the probationer.
1. Finding the Right Program:
Which Method is Least Intrusive but Most Effective?
The Second Circuit noted that a special needs search regime
"must seek a minimum of intrusiveness coupled with maximal
effectiveness."' 1 4 But this ideal is difficult to apply in the case of
computer monitoring. Courts must consider how computer
monitoring software will capture and store information, what
103. Id. at 183.
104. Id. at 186.
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information it will capture, how frequently it will collect data, and
whether it may be easily circumvented. 0 5 A brief survey of the
available monitoring technology suggests which of the available
software options comply completely with the guidelines set forth in
Lifshitz.
There are basically three types of computer surveillance
software available. The first is forensic software, which essentially
creates a duplicate image of the subject's computer and then
systematically examines its contents.' 6 The second is monitoring
software, which routinely records computer activity.10 7 The third is
filtering or blocking software, which prevents the subject from
accessing particular sites or content.1
0 8
a. Forensic software
Forensic software offers the most thorough, but also the most
intrusive, form of computer search. Most forensic software allows
the officer to create a duplicate image of a computer drive, including
deleted files and unallocated data.' ° 9 Because it can take hours to
copy a single drive, it generally requires seizure of the computer to
accommodate the duplication. 1 ° After a copy of the drive is
obtained, the investigator then systematically examines its con-
105. See Lanny L. Newville, Computer Searches and Access to Monitoring
Tools: A Briefing for Judicial Officers (Jan. 4, 2002), at http://www.cy
bercrime.flmp.uscourts.gov/Presentation/CAMT.ppt.
106. Jim Tanner, Rethinking Computer Management of Sex Offenders Under
Community Supervision, 15 J. OFFENDER MoNITORING 11 (Summer/Fall
2002), available at http://www.kbsolutions.com/rcm.pdf.
107. Brian J. Kelly, Supervising the Cyber Criminal, 65 FED. PROBATION 8,
10 (2001), available at www.uscourts.gov/fedprob/2001 septfp.pdf.
108. Mark Sherman, Introduction to Cyber Crime, SPECIAL NEEDS
OFFENDERS BULL., Aug. 2000, at 11 (noting that some districts have required
filtering software as a special condition) available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SNOBu15.pdf/$file/SNOBull5.pdf.
109. Some of the more popular programs include: EnCase, Forensic Tool
Kit, Professional P3, Omniquad Detective and Net Analysis. Tanner, supra
note 106. For a discussion of the capabilities of the EnCase, Professional P3
and ComputerCop software programs, see Mark Sherman, Cyber Crime and
Cyber Terrorism, SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDERS BULL., Apr. 2002, at 9-10,
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/SNOCybO2.pdf/$file/
SNOCyb02.pdf.
110. Tanner, supra note 106. For a brief discussion of the legality of off-site
computer searches, see Kreston, supra note 23, at 346-47.
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tents."' Because this approach requires seizure of the computer and
examination of every part of the drive, it falls well outside the
guidelines set forth in Lifshitz.
Other forensics software applications are less intrusive. Some
include a preview function that allows an initial search of a target
drive. " 2 Others run from a CD on the probationer's computer and
can be set to target keywords created by the officer or selected from
a predetermined list.1 13  Thus, these applications can be more
narrowly tailored to search for specific illegal activity and are closer
to meeting the Lifshitz guidelines. However, these methods still
require the physical presence of a probation officer in the
probationer's home, a method the Lifshitz court described as more
intrusive than continuous, narrowly tailored monitoring.114
b. Monitoring software
Computer monitoring software runs on an offender's machine
and routinely captures information on computer activity. 115 It may
do this either by capturing and saving screen images of what is
displayed on the monitor or by collecting and storing keystroke
data-or a combination of both. 1 6 Software packages may be active
or passive."17  Active programs email the results to the probation
officer while passive programs store results on the probationer's
computer. Because active programs do not require an in-person visit
from a probation officer to retrieve information, they are less
intrusive and therefore more in line with Lifshitz guidelines.
Most monitoring software can be used to collect everything a
probationer does on his computer, including email exchanges, chat
room participation, Internet activity and every keystroke typed." 8
111. Tanner, supra note 106.
112. Sherman, supra note 109, at 9.
113. Id. at 9-10; Kelly, supra note 107, at 8.
114. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004).
115. Some of the more popular monitoring programs include: Spector
Professional, E-Blaster, STARR, Winwhatwhere, Redhand Lite and Desktop
Surveillance. Tanner, supra note 106. For a discussion of the capabilities of
the Spector, E-Blaster and Echo software programs, see Sherman, supra note
109, at 8-9.
116. Newville, supra note 105.
117. Id.
118. Tanner, supra note 106.
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This kind of monitoring may be too broad to comply with Lifshitz.
The Second Circuit noted that such "constant inspection" is more
like searching a diary than like a targeted drug test.119 However,
some programs include keyword triggers, which email results to the
probation officer when the user has entered in specific words or
phrases.' 20  If the state employs this functionality, the search
becomes more narrowly tailored. Thus, because computer monitor-
ing does not require a home visit to collect the data and can be
narrowly tailored, it may fall within Lifshitz guidelines if it is used in
that manner.
c. Filtering software
Filtering software works either on the local user's machine or
through an Internet Service Provider (ISP) or other off-site server to
block access to a predefined list of sites that can be supplemented by
the probation officer. 121 Others block access to sites based on a
rating system.12 2 This software is minimally intrusive in that it does
not continuously monitor computer use. It simply blocks access to
prohibited sites. On the other hand, drawbacks in the effedtiveness
of some programs make them undesirable as the sole means of
supervision.
Filtering software that relies on lists of prohibited sites and runs
on a user's computer is not an effective choice for supervision. An
estimated 18 to 25 million pages of sexually related content currently
exists on the Internet as well as over 700 newsgroups whose titles
indicate sexual content. 123 As new Web sites crop up, probation
officers face the near impossible task of updating the directory of
forbidden web pages to prevent access to new content. 12 4 Moreover,
this type of filtering would not prevent an offender from using email
to send or receive forbidden materials. 125  Finally, this filtering
119. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 191-92.
120. For example, SpectorSoft and E-Blaster can be set to send alerts when a
keyword or phrase is detected. Laura Delaney, Monitoring Software, PC
MAGAZINE, Aug. 3, 2004, available at http://www.pcmag.com/article2/
0,1759,1619367,00.asp.
121. Newville, supra note 105.
122. Id.
123. Tanner, supra note 106.
124. See McKay, supra note 14, at 235.
125. Id.
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software is relatively easy to circumvent. 
126
Programs that run on an ISP or other web proxy server may be
more effective. A proxy server receives all file requests from a local
user, retreives those requests from a different server, then relays the
files back to the user.12 7 It is, essentially, a middle man between the
local user and the Internet. Since it can control all network traffic,
this kind of filtering can be set to block inappropriate web page
content as well as email messages. 128 The Lifshitz court provided
one example of how this kind of monitoring might work in the
probation context. 2 9 It noted a program in Bexar County, Texas,
that requires probationers to use a specific ISP, which in turn keeps
tabs on their online activities and denies access to sex-related sites
and newsgroups or chat rooms children might visit.13
0
Because filtering software has different capabilities depending
on the program used and whether it runs locally or through another
server, it is difficult to make a sweeping judgment as to its suitability
under the Lifshitz opinion. Moreover, as noted below, the effective-
ness of any software depends on both the skill of the probation
officer ind the acumen of the probationer. Courts must weigh all
these considerations when selecting a monitoring regimen for a
particular probationer.
d. Circumvention issues
It is difficult to find a computer surveillance approach that is
both minimally invasive and maximally effective. Each method of
computer surveillance has vulnerabilities that cyber-savvy
probationers may exploit. For example, offenders can defeat
forensic tools by masking files through the use of layered images,
encryption or steganography, which is the practice of hiding
messages within a larger document. 131  Monitoring software
designed for use on a specific operating system can be circumvented
if the probationer simply boots from another system or from a
126. Sherman, supra note 108, at 12.
127. WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_proxy (defining "proxy
server") (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
128. See id. (noting that many organizations use web proxies to enforce
network use policies).
129. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 192 (2d Cir. 2004).
130. Id.
131. Tanner, supra note 106.
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different computer altogether. 132 Finally, as noted above, filtering
software is also fairly easy to circumvent. 133 However, some of the
problems with effectiveness can be addressed by crafting detailed
probation conditions.
2. The Devil Is in the Details:
Probation Conditions and Proper Training
Can Maximize Effectiveness
Cyber-savvy offenders may have technological prowess far
exceeding that of the officers assigned to supervise them. 134 Search
conditions must be drafted "based on the experience and ability of
the supervision staff conducting the monitoring, as well as the level
of computer knowledge and skills the defendant possesses."' 13 For
example, courts should take care to add provisions that limit a
probationer's ability to block monitoring software. 13 6  Other
suggested conditions include requiring that the probationer possess
only computer hardware or software approved by the probation
officer; that the probationer be limited to a single computer at home
and at work; and mandating disclosure of the probationer's computer
passwords and ISP information.
13 7
This discussion touches on the major issues facing courts as they
draft computer search conditions to comply with Fourth Amendment
concerns. Other practical concerns include training personnel and
cost issues. Recognizing this challenge, the Federal Corrections and
Supervision Division has undertaken efforts to provide guidance to
the courts and training for court officers. 138 As resources on the
issue grow, courts will face a lighter fact-finding burden. In the end,
complying with the Lifshitz guidelines seems a small price to pay in
132. Sherman, supra note 108, at 12. For example, a probationer can avoid
Windows-based monitoring software by pressing F8 when the computer boots,
bypassing Windows and using Web browsers available for DOS without
detection. Id.
133. See Sherman, supra note 108, at 12.
134. Lanny L. Newville, Cyber Crime and the Courts: Investigating and
Supervising the Information Age Offender, 65 FED. PROBATION 11, 13 (2001).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Arthur L. Bowker & Gregory B. Thompson, Computer Crime in the
21st Century and Its Effect on the Probation Officer, 65 FED. PROBATION 18,
21(2001).
138. Newville, supra note 105.
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exchange for the guarantee that the government's surveillance power
does not exceed its legitimate grasp.
B. Privacy Implications:
Public Needs and Reasonable Expectations
Privacy advocates criticize special needs searches as a slippery
slope leading to an evisceration of the Fourth Amendment's demand
for a minimum of individualized suspicion. 3 9 There is cause for
concern when a court allows suspicionless computer monitoring.
Moreover, Lifshitz's analysis of reasonable expectations of privacy
draws a distinction between offline and online computer use that
appears to disregard privacy interests in the latter. Although the
particular need to prevent recidivism among sex offenders and child
pornographers justifies the court's reasoning, any extension of the
Lifshitz opinion beyond this context poses a significant threat to
computer privacy.
1. Public Needs: Child Pornography as a Compelling
Justification for Suspicionless Computer Monitoring
Special needs searches, which in some cases do not require even
minimal suspicion, allow the government broad power to invade an
individual's privacy. Although the Lifshitz ruling may be seen by
computer privacy advocates as a setback, the particular need to
monitor sex offenders' computer use justifies the Second Circuit's
ruling. Moreover, this justification may distinguish Lifshitz from
computer monitoring in other contexts.
In Lifshitz, the Second Circuit was correct in its determination
that the high rate of recidivism among sex offenders and the
government interest in eradicating child pornography made the need
to monitor computer use particularly acute. 140 In 2002, the U.S.
Department of Justice filed 1,199 cases involving child pornography
and child exploitation statutes, a twenty-two percent increase from
2001.41 Approximately 20,000 images of child pornography appear
139. See George M. Dery, III, Are Politicians More Deserving of Privacy
than Schoolchildren? How Chandler v. Miller Exposed the Absurdities of
Fourth Amendment "Special Needs" Balancing, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 73, 75
(1998) (stating that special needs jurisprudence created a slippery slope that
allowed increasingly aggressive government intrusions).
140. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2004).
141. Indecent Exposure: Oversight of DOJ's Efforts to Protect
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on the Internet every week. 142 The Internet poses a challenge to
effective supervision of offenders because it allows users to easily
exchange and hide illegal images. 143 Finally, and most disturbingly,
the Internet serves as a forum where sex offenders may validate their
behavior and seek out victims.
44
The dangers posed by offenders online cannot be contained with
regular in-person supervision. 45 Police arrest roughly eighteen
thousand sex offenders in the United States each year. 14 On
average, sixty percent of those convicted receive probation.'
47
Probation officers and local computer forensics labs do not have the
time or resources to handle the volume of tasks presented by
individually searching offenders' computers upon reasonable sus-
picion of wrongdoing. 148  In addition, monitoring software can
capture computer activity that took place on removable drives or
disks while in-person inspections cannot. 1
49
Suspicionless computer monitoring not only addresses an
important public safety concern, it also holds benefits for the
individual searched. First, when courts have the choice to require
effective computer supervision, they may forgo imposing a condition
that requires a sex offender to get permission before using a
computer or one that places an outright ban on computer or Internet
use.1 50 Indeed, in its decision in Sofsky, the Second Circuit indicated
that monitoring is a preferable choice.' 5' Second, suspicionless
monitoring of sex offenders' and child pornographers' computer use
may offer therapeutic benefits as it deters the aberrant behavior, thus
preventing a relapse.1
5 2
In light of the unique circumstances in child pornography cases,
Pornography's Victims Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2003)
(statement of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Crim. Div.,
United States Dep't of Justice).
142. Id.
143. McKay, supra note 14, at 209.
144. Id. at 209-11.
145. Tanner, supra note 106.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. McKay, supra note 14, at 243.
151. See supra Part 1V.C.
152. McKay, supra note 14, at 228.
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privacy advocates should not be dismayed by the Lifshitz opinion. In
Lifshitz, the court correctly expressed a reluctance to "ratify
implausible or overbroad assertions of 'special needs"' and noted
that the need involved "must not be isomorphic with law
enforcement."' 53 Rather, the court took pains to stress the particular
need for the search in child pornography cases. This effort may
cabin the opinion and avoid its application to computer monitoring in
other contexts. As a result, the Second Circuit may have avoided
greasing the special needs slippery slope.
2. Reasonable Expectations:
Examining the Second Circuit's Distinctions
Interestingly, the Second Circuit's application of the reasonable
expectation standard may have undermined privacy in some respects
but arguably upheld it in others. The court acknowledged "dis-
tinctions between the levels of privacy that may be involved in
disparate types of computer use."' 54 These differences depend not
only on how a computer is used, but also on whether a policy
governs that use.
a. Online versus offline computer use
As noted above, the Second Circuit asserted that individuals
possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in their home computers,
but this expectation does not extend to Internet transmissions or sent
email. 55 However, the case the Second Circuit cites to support this
proposition applied to public online bulletin board postings. Thus, it
is unclear whether the court meant that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in any Internet transmission or whether it
applies only to online postings intended for publication.1
56
153. United States v. Lifshitz, 369 U.S. 173, 185 (2d Cir. 2004).
154. Id. at 183.
155. Id. at 190. Commentators contend, with some dismay, that the Supreme
Court may not extend Fourth Amendment protection to e-mail because people
perceive it as susceptible to interception. See e.g., Max Guirguis, Electronic
Mail Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 8 J. TECH. L. &
POL'Y 135 (2003); Scott A. Sundstrom, Note, You've Got Mail! (and the
Government Knows It): Applying the Fourth Amendment to Workplace E-mail
Monitoring, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2064, 2087 (1998).
156. The court first notes that individuals "may not.., enjoy... an expec-
tation of privacy in transmissions over the Interet .... " Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at
190. But it then goes on to quote Guest v. Leis stating, "Users would logically
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The distinction is an important one. If the court meant that
individuals have no privacy interest in any online communication,
then such a failure to draw distinctions among types of Internet use
has troubling privacy implications. If this approach to Internet
communication were applied in other contexts, "the prospect of
unregulated government monitoring" of email and online communi-
cation could chill legal online behavior.' 57 For example, journalists
and online political organizers may legitimately wish to avoid
disclosure of personal contacts. 15  Permitting unfettered access to
individuals' online activities "may thus impede certain forms of
political affiliation and journalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of
a truly free society."' 59 Given the court's overall approach in the
case, it is unlikely that it meant that individuals have no expectation
of privacy in any Internet activity. The prospect that the opinion
could potentially be cited as support for that proposition is a
troubling one.
b. At-work versus at-home computer use
Privacy advocates will most likely be heartened that the Second
Circuit did not hold that the imposition of a search condition
eliminated a probationer's expectation of privacy. Rather, the
Second Circuit distinguished between home-based and work-based
computer activity. It noted that while employees have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their place of work, 160 that interest does not
extend to computer files when their employer has instituted a search
policy. 161 However, the imposition of a probation search condition
lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for
publication or public posting." Id. (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333
(6th Cir. 2001)).
157. Maclin, supra note 43, at 134.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987).
161. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 187. Several circuits have adopted this position.
See e.g., United States v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, 683-84 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
an employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy when government
policy limits computer use to official government business); Muick v.
Glenayre Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that an employer
search policy for laptops destroyed employee's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy); United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002)
(finding no expectation of online privacy when university policy reserved the
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merely reduces (as opposed to eliminates) a probationer's
expectation of privacy. 1
62
Thus, even in the presence of a compelling government interest
to stop child pornography, the court upheld one aspect of computer
privacy by suggesting that probationers retain a privacy interest in
their at-home computer use.
VI. CONCLUSION
Legal scholars express concern over the reasonable expectation
approach to Fourth Amendment rights because it poses a danger that
people's expectation of privacy will be "driven by what the
government has the technological capability to do."'163 Others note
that an objective measure of computer privacy is impossible where
knowledge concerning the vulnerability of Internet transmissions and
computer files varies so widely. 164 There are those who believe,
perhaps rightly, that as modem technology advances, individual
expectations of privacy retreat.' 65 Given this foment, what is most
striking about the court's decision in Lifshitz is its belief that new
technologies could protect a probationer's privacy interests as more
narrowly tailored, less invasive methods of computer monitoring
become available. By rejecting the notion of a computer as a
medium that could or could not be searched, the court left the door
open to future technological developments that may foster greater
privacy protection. 1
66
right to randomly audit Internet use); Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73-74
(2d Cir. 2001) (finding that an employee had a legitimate expectation of
computer privacy but noting the absence of a computer search or use policy);
United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding no expec-
tation of privacy when policy explicitly limited computer use to official
government business).
162. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 190.
163. See e.g., Catherine M. Barrett, FBI Internet Surveillance: The Need for
a Natural Rights Application of the Fourth Amendment to Insure Internet
Privacy, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16, para. 22 (Spring 2002), at http://
www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v8i3/articlel 6.htm.
164. Wells, supra note 89, at 112.
165. See Clancy, supra note 45, at 335.
166. For example, in United States v. Balon, the court denied the defendant's
challenge to the conditions of supervised release as premature because he
would not be released for another three years. 384 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 2004)
("The technology that holds the key to whether the special condition in this
case involves a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary is
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The other remarkable aspect of the Lifshitz decision is its focus
on the content of the search policy. The court took great pains to
ensure that the government intrusion on Lifshitz's computer privacy
was as limited as possible. This is significant in light of the fact that
computers and the Internet are integral to the growing dissemination
of child pornography. As a result, the court's decision could con-
ceivably be used to challenge other warrantless computer searches
where the government's interest is not as compelling.
"Cases evaluating the use of surveillance technologies determine
the substantive level of privacy and security of society in general, not
simply whether the government's investigation of a particular
individual was reasonable." 167 When a court decides to allow the
government to use new surveillance technologies, it expands
"government power at the expense of the public's privacy." 16 It is
clear from the Second Circuit's careful, principled approach in
Lifshitz that it took this responsibility seriously.
Shauna Curphey*
constantly and rapidly changing.").
167. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amend-
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